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Introduction
Along with, and partially due to the recent trend towards central bank independence around the globe, central banks have become remarkably more transparent in the last decades. One trigger for increased transparency has likely been the requirement for greater accountability of independent central banks (Issing, 1999) . At the same time, however, it has been increasingly understood that transparency can enhance the effectiveness of policy (Blinder 1998 , Woodford 2003 . Accordingly, central banks put a much larger weight on their communication with the public nowadays than they used to some years ago.
This paper adds to a young, but rapidly growing literature on central bank communication by focusing on the timing of such communication. The paper does so from two perspectives. First, it asks the question whether the timing of communication of central banks shows some systematic patterns, in the sense that we look for occasions when the intensity of communication increases. We suggest several scenarios where such an increased intensity could be useful for a central bank, and explore whether communication does indeed intensify. Second, the paper addresses the issue whether central bank communication exerts differential effects on financial markets, depending on its timing or the circumstances. Again, various cases are suggested and tested. By combining these two approaches, it is possible to check whether they are interrelated; this would be the case, for example, if market reactions are stronger in times of more intense communication.
The paper analyses three of the world's major central banks: the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank (ECB). Based on quantitative measures of communication, it identifies circumstances in which communication intensifies. This is most notably the case prior to interest rate changes, although we find more generally a higher frequency of communication in preparation of committee meetings, regardless of the upcoming decision. Beyond this, communication becomes more frequent also in other circumstances, although these differ across the three central banks. The detection of differences in the intensity of communication suggests that its
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Monetary policy has a relatively direct leverage over very short-term (i.e., overnight) interest rates.
To steer the behaviour of economic agents, however, it is necessary to affect longer-term interest rates, where the central bank influence is much more indirect. Blinder (1998) and Bernanke (2004) emphasise the importance for communication as a means for central banks to influence these asset prices, provided that the central bank has acquired a credible reputation. In that respect, communication is an important tool for the effectiveness of monetary policy implementation (Buiter 1999 , Eijffinger and Hoeberichts 2004 , Issing 2005 . It is important that communication manages to influence the expectations of economic agents, such that the desired reaction of longer-term interest rates is achieved.
In principle, communication can in parts even substitute policy action. Demiralp and Jorda (2004) provide evidence that by announcing changes in the intended federal funds rate since 1994, it was possible for the Federal Reserve to move the federal funds rate with a smaller volume of openmarket operations, which indicates clearly that increased transparency and more communication can indeed be beneficial for the efficiency of policy implementation. Moving one step further, there might even be an effect on financial markets if the central bank communicates its views about the intended level of asset prices and signals its intention to make the necessary adjustments in policy rates if asset prices deviate from this target, a policy that has frequently been labelled "open-mouth operations" (Guthrie and Wright 2000, Thornton 2004 ).
Although there is a general consensus that communication is a powerful and efficiency-enhancing tool for monetary policy, several authors have argued that there might at the same time be a tradeoff in that more communication need not always be optimal. King (2000) argues that a central bank should be highly transparent about its monetary policy reaction function and its target. Beyond that, however, a central bank should refrain from "creating" news -instead, news should entirely arise from information about the development of the economy. The central bank is also facing a trade-off when giving more information induces not more but less clarity and common understanding among market participants, as there are limits to how much information can be digested effectively (Kahnemann 2003 , Winkler 2000 . The trade-off might become even more pronounced if the central bank communicates about issues on which it receives noisy signals itself, such as the evolution of the economy (as opposed to, e.g., its intentions regarding upcoming interest rate decisions). Amato, Morris and Shin (2002) argue that such communication can co-ordinate the actions of financial market participants away from fundamentals, in the sense that they attach too much weight to the central bank's views, not taking into account that they reflect a noisy signal. On the other hand, Svensson (2005) suggests that such an outcome is rather unlikely under plausible ranges for the model's parameter values. In sum, however, it is clear that transparency is not an end in itself but merely a means to help the authority achieve its mandate (Issing 1999 , Mishkin 2004 ).
The empirical literature on central bank communication is still in its infancy, but has been growing rapidly recently. There is a general consensus that communication is a powerful tool to move financial markets. Guthrie and Wright (2000) find this for the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Kohn and Sack (2004) for the Federal Reserve, and Reeves and Sawicki (2005) for the Bank of England. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005b) compare the effect of communication by committee members for the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the ECB. They find that the effectiveness depends not only on the design of the communication strategy, but also on the nature of the decision-making process in the committee. The paper shows that the Federal Reserve and the ECB follow a more hands-on approach to communication, which provides more guidance to markets in the preparation for upcoming decisions than the Bank of England, which communicates much less about the future outlook for interest rates. The approach adopted by the Bank of England is consistent with the above-mentioned views by King (2000) , that central banks should not create news themselves. In line with Reeves and Sawicki (2005) , Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005b) find that communication by MPC members is not very influential in moving financial markets. In contrast, they identify substantial effects on asset prices for the Federal Reserve and the ECB.
Beyond its importance in normal times, communication has been highlighted as a particularly effective tool under the zero lower bound, i.e. when nominal interest rates are close or equal to zero (Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack 2004, Woodford 2005) . Finally, there is evidence that it is in particular statements including an indication about the future path of policy that move financial markets Fratzscher 2005a, Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson 2005) .
Another strand of the literature analyses the content of central bank communication. Gerlach (2004) develops a quantitative indicator from the assessment of inflation, economic activity and M3 growth in the editorial of the ECB's Monthly Bulletins, and finds that this indicator can explain interest-rate setting of the ECB. In a similar fashion, Rosa and Verga (2005) and Heinemann and Ullrich (2005) analyse the content of the ECB's introductory statements to the press conference following Governing Council meetings. They construct indicators for the monetary policy stance of the ECB based on the words used in the statements, and similarly show that the indicators can explain interest-rate setting, although they serve as substitutes, not as complements to macroeconomic variables in Taylor-type rules.
Finally, some authors have analysed to what extent communication is consistent across committee members. Jansen and de Haan (2004) find that statements among the individual members of the ECB's Governing Council about interest rates exhibited some degree of dispersion initially, which decreased over time, whereas they identify an increasing dispersion in statements about inflation. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005b) show that the importance given to personal views of committee members differs across central banks. The ECB and the Bank of England follow a collegial approach to communication, with a high degree of consistency compared to the Federal Reserve, where communication is significantly more dispersed.
Measuring communication
Communication of central banks has many facets (Blinder et al. 2001; Geraats, 2002) Reserve eventually even the transcripts. In contrast, the ECB does not publish minutes of its meetings, but provides an in-depth explanation of its decisions in a press conference immediately after the meetings, with extended Q&A sessions.
Whereas all these forms of communication are extremely important parts of the communication toolkit of each of the three central banks, their timing is generally pre-scheduled. In that sense, neither of these forms provides the flexibility to communicate changes in the committee's views to the public instantaneously. The most adequate instrument in this respect has to be seen in communication by the individual committee members in the inter-meeting period. This is the type of communication we will focus on in the context of this paper, as it is the only form that can flexibly respond to new information by adjusting its intensity or its timing. This classification is therefore judgmental, based on our own reading of the newswire reports. Accordingly, misclassifications cannot entirely be ruled out. However, in line with the principles of content analysis (Holsti 1969) , we reduced the chance of misclassification by having two persons analyse critical statements independently. In those cases where we were unsure about the 2 Examples of reports and our classification decisions are provided in Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005b) .
classification of the statement, we double-checked subsequent reports about the same statement and classified them accordingly or discarded them.
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By using a prominent newswire as the data source, we explicitly take a financial market perspective in our analysis. This implies that we focus only on those statements that actually reach market 10 ECB Working Paper Series No. 565 December 2005 participants, and take measure them in the way they arrive at the markets. Therefore, there could be statements by committee members that are not part of our analysis, as they are not reported by the newswire service. Furthermore, the newswire service might have misunderstood or misinterpreted the intention of the speaker, such that there could be cases where the content of the report as it arrives at financial markets is not the one intended by the speaker. For our purposes, however, it is crucial to take the perspective of the recipients and not of the sender of communication, as we are interested in testing the efficiency of communication. Finally, it is important to note that our dataset is constructed at a daily frequency. Of course, other pieces of news hit and influence financial markets every day. In order to avoid that we mis-measure the effect of communication, we control for a large number of factors in our econometric, as detailed below. 
The timing of communication and its effectiveness 4.1 Timing communication: when do central banks talk?
The first question this paper will address is whether we can identify a systematic pattern in the December 2005 There is one striking similarity across all central banks: on the days immediately prior to the monetary policy meetings, there is a considerably smaller amount of communication compared to other days. 4 Furthermore, the intensity of communication is different before than after meetings for all three central banks. With the exception of the days surrounding the monetary policy meetings, there is a somewhat higher level of activity before than after meetings (which is statistically significant at the 5% level for the case of the ECB, and at the 10% level for the Bank of England), stressing the attempt of central banks to prepare markets for the upcoming meeting.
Moving from differences within inter-meeting periods to an analysis of the patterns that explain the intensity of communication across inter-meeting periods, Table 1 Even though we are careful in covering only forward-looking communication in our database, central banks might see a need to communicate more intensely to the public in the aftermath of a decision to change interest rates. Given such a step, there might be a need for markets to understand whether further interest rate changes can be expected, or whether the preceding interest rate move should be considered the last in an interest rate cycle. The recent experience with the FOMC's balance-of-risks assessments makes this point clear -following each interest rate decision, the FOMC decided to immediately tune the markets in for another rate change, through the formulation that "the Committee believes that policy accommodation can be removed at a pace that is likely to 
Communication effects: when do financial markets respond?
In this subsection, we test for the impact of communication on financial markets. As shown in Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005b) , communication is a powerful tool to move financial markets.
Although the strength of the effects differs across central banks, it is estimated significantly for all three of them. For the purpose of this paper, we will analyse whether the response of asset prices to communication depends on the circumstances in which such communication arrives at the markets.
Markets might seek more guidance from central banks if there has been a change in interest rates at the last meeting, or if there is large market uncertainty. Additionally, as shown in the previous section, markets might be perceptive to changes in communication frequency or content, as these could signal new information that the central bank wants to convey. Accordingly, we will also 7 A necessary condition in that respect is that the communication is consistent with the upcoming interest rate change. This is indeed the case for all three central banks in the sense that the number of consistent statements is significantly larger than 50%, as shown in Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005b) .
analyse whether markets react differently prior to meetings with interest rate changes, and in response to communication that "leans with" or "leans against the wind", in the sense of being in line with the last policy change or not.
We look at both the yield curve as well as at equity prices, exchange rates and inflation expectations. Interest rate data are US Treasury bill rates for the US, and interbank rates and government bond yields for the euro area and the UK. (2002), we use one-month EONIA swap rates for the euro area, and onemonth LIBOR rates for the UK and the US. 9 See, e.g., Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005c) . The set of macro news comprises advance GDP, consumer confidence, CPI, industrial production, ISM survey, nonfarm payrolls, PPI, retail sales, trade balance and unemployment for the United States; GPD, earnings, industrial production, manufacturing production, M4, PPI, RPIX, retail sales, trade balance and unemployment for the UK; euro area business confidence and consumer confidence, German ifo business climate, industrial production, PPI, retail sales, trade balance, unemployment, CPI and GDP for the euro area. 10 Remember that we only record communication by committee members on days without other distinguishes between various scenarios, and by interacting this dummy variable with the parameters of interest. To give an example, the dummy variable would be set to D t =1 for all days in between two meetings, where interest rates are changed at the second meeting and to D t =0 for all days of the inter-meeting periods prior to meetings without interest rate changes.
We assume that The EGARCH approach corrects for the kurtosis, skewness, and time-varying volatility of the asset price. An additional advantage of the EGARCH approach is that we do not need to impose nonnegativity constraints on the conditional second moments. The model is estimated via loglikelihood estimation of the function However, one would expect that following an interest rate change, markets need information about when and whether to expect further changes, and of what size any further changes will be. In other words, it will be important for markets to understand the views of the central bank as to the contribution of the last interest rate move to removing any risks to price stability or economic growth. Looking at financial market responses, we see that there are only a few instances where differences are estimated in a significant fashion. At the same time, however, it is clear that the parameters are generally considerably larger in the aftermath of interest rate changes for both the Federal Reserve and the ECB. In the United States, this difference is particularly substantial for three-month rates: interest rates move by nearly three times as much, namely by 2.2 basis points as opposed to 0.8 basis points otherwise. Similar, although weaker differences are found throughout the maturity spectrum.
Looking at communication about the economic outlook, the differences are particularly striking for the Federal Reserve, as reported in the first set of results in England, there is no significant differentiation, also because economic outlook communication generally moves financial markets only very little. This is in line with earlier findings, and is likely to reflect the differences in the monetary policy strategies of the three central banks.
The second test reported in table 2 tests whether there is a difference in the response of financial markets to communication in times prior to interest rate decisions. The differentiation applied to this test is whether interest rates change at the upcoming meeting. It has been shown in the preceding section that the intensity of communication tends to increase. If this higher frequency of communication provides signals to the markets, we should expect particularly strong effects at the short end of the maturity spectrum, which is indeed what we find. The response of financial markets to communication is substantially larger prior to interest rate changes, and significantly more so for the Federal Reserve and the ECB. In fact, 3-month interest rates react two to three times stronger to statements about the monetary policy inclinations when interest rates are indeed changed in the subsequent meeting. A similar pattern can be detected when looking at communication about the economic outlook, where we find stronger responses at the short end of the yield curve in the euro area as well as in the United States.
Finally, the last set of results reported in tables 2 and 3 relates to the effect of communication depending on its content. These tests address the question whether communication exerts larger effects if it is "leaning with" or "leaning against" the current policy stance, as measured by the direction of the last interest rate change. In order to form any hypothesis about the expected effects, it is important to know that the communication by the ECB's Governing Council members tends to be collegiate, whereas FOMC members more often express their personal and possibly deviating views in the public (see Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2005b) . Under dispersed communication, markets need to understand to which positions they should attach relatively more weight. This can be achieved by identifying the more influential persons in the committee, or by aiming to identify the more influential positions at a given point in time. Tests for the former possibility have shown that financial markets in the United States attach a larger weight to statements by Chairman Greenspan (Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2005b) . The results shown here suggest that also the second strategy is practiced by the markets: statements that are in line with the current stance are given more weight by markets. We find statistically significant differences for communication about the economic outlook, but not for monetary policy inclination. However, it is interesting to note that statements about the economic outlook by the Federal Reserve that lean against the policy stance are not able to move financial markets beyond the 6-month maturities at all, whereas we find that congruent statements are market movers far into the maturity spectrum. In contrast, for a more collegiate communication strategy like the ECB's, statements that are opposed to the policy stance might be particularly informative to financial markets, because they could potentially signal upcoming changes in the future policy stance. Accordingly, we should expect larger effects of such statements with the views of King (2000) Notes: The vertical axis indicates the fraction of days in which communication takes place. The bars aggregate data from four days (i.e., bar "-1" contains days 4, 3, 2 and 1 before a meeting of the decisionmaking body). The first and last bars additionally contain 9 observations on days beyond ±16. Notes: The vertical axis indicates the fraction of days in which communication takes place. The bars aggregate data from three days (i.e., bar "-1" contains days 3, 2 and 1 before a meeting of the decision-making body). Notes: The vertical axis indicates the fraction of days in which communication takes place. The bars aggregate data from two days (i.e., bar "-1" contains days 2 and 1 before a meeting of the decision-making body). The first and last bars additionally contain 22 observations on days beyond ±8 29 ECB Working Paper Series No. 565 December 2005 
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